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WAGES AND PRICES ARE NOT ALWAYS STICKY:
A CENTURY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S., U.K., AND JAPAN
ABSTRACT
Arthur M. Okun's last book, Prices and Quantities, contributes a theory
of universal wage and price stickiness, but provides no explanation at all of
historical and cross country differences in behavior. The core of this paper
provides a new empirical characterization of price and wage changes over the
last century in the U.S., U.K., and Japan, in order to demonstrate the wide
variety of historical responses that have occurred. Equations for changes in
the GNP deflator, in the hourly manufacturing wage rate, and in the real wage
rate are estimated, with attention to the influence of both demand and supply
disturbances. Because of the long sample period involved, extending back to
1875 for the U.K. and to 1892 for the other two countries, there is extensive
attention to shifts in parameters.
My description of U.S. data differs from Okun's framework by rejecting
his wage—wage formulation of the postwar U.S. inflation inertia process, by
allowing the impact of demand disturbances to depend on both the level and
rate of change of aggregate demand, by allowing demand to influence price—
setting as well as wage—setting behavior, and by stressing the fact that in-
ertia in the U.S. adjustment process is purely a postwar phenomenon rather than
the universal fact implied by Okun. The results for the U.K. and Japan com-
pound the conflict with Okun's analysis, since in these two countries wages
have been far from sticky, even in postwar years. Prices and wages were
particularly flexible in the U.S. during World War I and its aftermath, in
Japan since 1914, and in the U.K. since the mid—1950s.
The last half of the paper provides an analysis of behavior in labor
markets and product markets. The unique nature of the U.S. postwar adjustment
reflects its unique institution of three—year staggered wage contracts, and
the analysis attempts to explain why we do not observe perfect insulation of
nominal wages from shifts in nominal demand. The section on the product mar-
kets examines the factors that explain why prices are often pre—set, and why
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"Indealing with suppliers, says Gale Frank, purchasing
manager forAro Corp., 'the worst problem in purchasing today
is the attitude thatthesupplier has a right to automatically
pass along cost increases. We're trying to combatthat."
I. INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic research needs to be reoriented away from a search
for the theoretical underpinnings of wage and price stickiness, and
toward an explanation for the enormous differences in the degree of
stickiness observed over ;itne and across countries. This paper begins
by criticizing Arthur Okun's book for contributing a theory of universal
wage and price stickiness, and for providing no explanation at all of
histor1cal and cross—country differences in behavior. It then provides
a new empirical characterization of price and wage changes over the last
century in the U.S., U.K., and Japan, in order to demonstrate the wide
variety of historical responses that have occurred. Finally, it lays
out a series of issues that must be treated in theoretical models, if
this historical experience is to be adequately explained.
Wageand Price Stickiness: The Central Issue inMacroeconomic Theory
Economists have beenobsessed with sticky wages for almost 50
years,an occupational disease that can be traced back to Keynes' deci-
sion in the General Theory to embed stickiness in his labor market's
rigid nominal wage. An initial generation of Keynesian models joined
rigid nominal wages to a traditional classical treatment of the product3
market that retained perfect competition and price flexibility, as in
the General Theory. This competitive product market assumption was
retained in most postwar macroeconomics textbooks; in Milton Friedman's
verbal treatment that gave rise to the Friedman—Lucas supply function;
and in the large new literature on labor—market contracts for firms that
are price—takers in product markets and wage—setters in labor
markets
2
Early in the postwar years, however, "mainline" macroeconomics
diverged from the competitive product market assumption, by shifting to
a stress on "full—cost pricing" that made the price level mimic the
sticky wage level, with little if any role for a flexible price response
to changes in aggregate demand. This view of the wage adjustment proc-
ess as a slowly crawling tortoise, and the price level as the slowly
crawling shadow beneath the tortoise, led several prominent economists
to develop the "fix—price" model of macroeconomic behavior, in which
output is viewed as a residual that reflects the interaction of variable
nominal demand growth with sluggish wage and price adjustment.3 At the
same time, frustrated with the failure of mainline macroeconomists to
provide an adequate theoretical explanation of stickiness, the "new
classical macroeconomists" in the 1970s reverted to the market—clearing
paradigm, in which there was no distinction between wages and prices——
both could move rapidly enough to clear markets and to allow agents to
remain on voluntary (or "notional") supply curves. Neoclassical agents
were pushed off their voluntary schedules not by the effective demand
constraints of the mainline models, but only by expectational errors
having a duration roughly equal to the publication lag of the St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank weekly financial statistics.4
Unanswered Questions in Okun's Analysis
Arthur Okun's last book can be viewed as an attempt to provide the
missing theory needed to explain the mainline assumption of macro-
economic wage and price stickiness.4 While initially dazzled by Okun's
common sense, insight, and expository skill, however, I have become
convinced that this great man wrote a book that is more satisfactory as
a description of microeconoinic behavior than as a contribution to the
macroeconomic debate on the causes of output fluctuations.5 The basic
problem is that Okun treated the postwar U.S. economy in isolation from
its own past history and from the development of labor— and product—
market institutions In other industrialized nations. The book contains
no ref ererce to any event in U.S. history prior to the post—Korean era,
other than a single reference to World War II price controls and another
to the implauibility of the search model as an explanation of worker
behavior during the Great Depression. The book's index contains only a
single reference to another country and that, to the U.K., Involves
in'comes policy rather than cross—country differences in macroeconomic
behavior. These omissions are serious, for neither Okun's "career"
long—term attachments model of the labor market, nor his cost—plus
"customer" model of the product market, is able to explain historical
and cross—country differences in behavior. Each model emerges from
reasoning on the situation of a universal homo economicus floating free
in time and space.
Historical and cross—country differences raise questions that must
be addressed by any reasonably complete theory of price adjustment and
inflation. Okun, with his sluggish wages and sticky prices, seems to be
thesource for the view that in the current year output responds by 905
percent and prices by only10percent of a change in nominalGNP.6 Yet
in the U.S. in World War I and its aftermath, the division was much
closer to 10—90 than 90—10 (see below). In the hyperinf1aons that
Sargent has proposed as a counterexample to current mainline thinking,
the division was more or less 0—100 within the current month.7 What
factors explain the ability of customer markets to shift from sluggish
to speedy price adjustment in these cases, and could those factors
recur? Similarly, wages in the postwar U.S. have responded more slug-
gishly to nominal GNP changes than in most other countries, yet long—
term career attachments between workers and firms are as important, if
not more important, in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere, as in the U.S.
Okun's labor and product markets not only lack a historical or
cultural dimension, but they also provide almost no room for interaction
between agents and policymakers. Wage behavior in Germany in 1973—74 or
Japan in 1979—80 may be hard to explain in isolation from the expecta-
tions of workers and firms about the likely actions of monetary policy—
makers; reverse causatIon is relevant as well, if the different
"propensity to accommodate" apparent on the part of, say, the British
vs. the German central bank, can be traced to their different expecta-
tions about the likely behavior of individual wage and price decisions
in response to their own monetary initatives.
Comparative Macroeconomic History as a Stimulus for New Answers
In three previous papers I have suggested economic and noneconomic
factors that might help partially to explain historical and cross—
country differences in macroeconomic behavior. The first began as a
critique of those monetarists whose explanation of inflation consisted
of little more than a time—series chart showing a high historical6
correlationbetween prices and money, without any explanation of why the
rate of monetary expansion had differed across time and between
countries. Although my analysis involved wartime finance, fixity of
exchange rates, and the political independence of central banks, its
main point was that central banks were less likely to "supply inflation"
in response to fiscal or supply—shock pressures if wage— and price—
setting institutions allowed a rapid and complete response of prices to
monetary restriction.8 This then required an explanation of differences
in those institutions. The second paper suggested that shifts in the
degree of price flexibility over time might be fruitfully explained by
embedding Friedman's and Lucas' distinction between local and aggregate
information in a model of price—setting by monopolists.9 The most
recent exercise documented the unusual sluggishness of U.S. postwar
nominal wage adjustment compared to that in Britain and Japan,
attributed this difference to the form of labor—market contracts, and
suggested that contract form and length was related in part to cultural
attitudes toward social and class conflict.'0
The core of this paper, contained in Part II, consists of an
empiricalanalysis of historical shifts in the degree of price and wage
flexibility in the U.S., U.K. and Japan. These results develop a set of
puzzles that form a research agenda for macroeconomic theory. Part III
develops a few ideas to explain historical and cross—country differences
in labor—market behavior. A central issue in any macroeconomic
discussion of labor markets is the extent of the contingencies, if any,
to which labor—maricet contracts are indexed; the forces working against
full indexation of labor markets are the same as those that prevent
firms from fully insulating their own real outcomes from nominal
shocks. Part IV investigates the economic forces that distinguish7
auction markets from customer markets where prices are set, and
addresses the most difficult issue, the determinants of shifts in the
speed of adjustment by firms which have access to aggregate information.
This paper does not develop mathematical theorems, or firm solu—
tions to tractable, narrowly defined problems. Instead, itcontains
conjecturesand suggestions about a broad area in which microeconomics
and macroeconomics overlap. Although some of the themes developed here
echo those ofmyrecent treatment ofthe product market in the Journal
ofEconomic Literature, this paper differs by includingamore extensive
empiricaltreatment of parameter shifts across time and countries, by
forswearing any systematic survey of related papers and ideas, and by
attempting to include some specific suggestions about the problems that
must be faced in developing formal models of product—market behavior.8
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PRICE AND WAGE RESPONSIVENESS
This section presents estimates of simple reduced—form equations
that describe the response of price and wage changes to demand disturb-
ances and supply shocks. A single equation, using an identical
specification, is estimated from annual data for the U.S., U.K., and
Japan over a period beginning in the late nineteenth century and extend-
ing to 1980. The main purpose of the econometric work is to
characterize shifts in the responsiveness of wages and prices to changes
in aggregate demand over this long historical period. The results
provide the basis for my claim in the introduction that wages and prices
are less sticky and inertia—bound in postwar U.K. and Japanese data than
in the postwar U.S., and that inertia in U.S. wage and price behavior is
purely a postwar phenomenon.
The Basic Specification
In the notation used here, upper—case letters designate logs of
levels, and lower—case letters designate rates of change. The basic
hypothesis to be tested emerges from separate equations for changes in
wages (w) and prices in both of which the explanatory variables
include the level and change in real aggregate demand, and a vector of
supply shift terms. In both equations the demand effect is proxied by
the level and change in the "output ratio," that is, the ratio of actual
real GNP to "natural" (or "potential") real GNP =— Q).In the
postwar U.S. this output ratio concept has a high negative correlation,
through Okun's Law, with the demographically adjusted unemployment rate
that George Perry introduced into the U.S. Phillips curve literature a
decade ago.1'9
The rate of wage change (w), then, is written as:
(1)w a1(a0 + +a2Q + a3Q + a4z + u,
whereis a vector of supply shift variables relevant for wage
behavior, and 1-'wt is an error term. Here a1 =1would be consistent
with a vertical long—run Phillips curve, and in this case a0couldbe
interpreted as the equilibrium growth rate of the real wage when the log
output ratio is zero and supply shocks are absent (zt =0).The
parallel price markup equation is:
(2) Pt =b1(w
—
b0)+ b2Q + b3Q + b4z + u,
where is a vector of supply shift variables relevant for price
behavior, and u is an error term. The constant term b0 can be inter-
preted as the rate of productivity growth relevant for price—setting
behavior, e.g., "standard productivity," so that w —b0is the growth
in "standard unit labor cost."
When the wage change equation (1) is substituted for w in equation
(2), and when we relabel coefficients, we obtain the following reduced
form price—change equation:
Pt =c0+ c1p1 +c2Q+c3lxQ+ c4z + Ut,
where
c0b1(a1a0—b0);c1 =b1a1;c2 =b2+ b1a2; c3 =b3+ b1a3;
cz =bz +ba z ;and u =u +bu 4t4pt l4wt tPtlwt10
Several simplifications are introduced into (1) and (2) in order to
allow this simple version of (3) to emerge. First, lagged wages are
excluded from both (1) and (2), and thus do not appear in (3).Second,
only a single lagged value of price change is entered ti' rather
than a polynomial in the lag operator as in my more detailed studies of
quarterly U.S. data. Next, the growth in the equilibrium real wage and
in standard productivity are introduced as constants rather than varia-
bles, allowing estimation to proceed without the introduction of data on
productivity change. Two obvious advantages of combining (1) and (2)
into (3) are evident immediately——no data on wages need be collected,
and no attempt need be made to decide in advance which supply shifts
(tax changes, programs of government intervention) are relevant for
wage—setting as opposed to price—setting behavior.12
It is possible to derive an alternative version of (3) by defining
"adjusted nominal GNP growth" as the excess of the growth rate of
nominal GNP over that of natural real GNP ( =— q).We can sub-
stitute the identity
(4) Q] +Y —Pt
into (3), and after simplifying, obtain:
(5) Pt =i+c3k0
+ c1p1 + (c23); + c2Q_1 +
c4z + ut].
In this framework the significance of the estimated coefficient on the
lagged output ratio indicates the presence of an output "level effect,"11
while the difference between the coefficient on adjusted nominal CNP
growth and the lagged output ratio indicates the relative size of the
"rate of change effect."3 If the coefficients on lagged price change
and on adjusted nominal GNP change sum to unity, then the "acceleration—
ist" hypothesis is validated, in the sense that a positive output ratio
(Qt_i>O) or an adverse supply shift (z>O) causes an acceleration of the
inflation rate relative to its past value.'4
Questions may be raised about the appearance of nominal GNP change
in equation (5), an equation explaining price change. Nominal GNP
change is indeed an endogenous variable, although no more so than the
current unemployment rate that has traditionally been used in Phillips
curve studies. The choice, then, between the alternative specifications
(3) and (5) comes down to whether nominal or real GNP is "more
exogenous." The advantage of using equation (5) for estimation becomes
clear when considering a period like 1915—22, when prices responded
extremely rapidly to changes in nominal GNP, with little residual effect
on real GNP. The exogenous event in this instance was an upsurge in
money—financed nominal spending. In a world of complete and contempo—
raneous price responsiveness to serially correlated nominal GNP move-
ments, as in some models in the tradition of the "new classical
economics," an investigator who forced all of the price adjustment to be
explained by real variables and lagged price change, as in (3), would
find his results plagued by positive serial correlation and an upward
bias in the coefficient on lagged price change.
Another alternative to (3), which would involve replacing nominal
GNP change by the change in a monetary aggregate, has the quite
different disadvantage that the resulting coefficient on money mixes up12
aggregatedemand and aggregate supply effects; that is, it reflects the
combined influence of the response of velocity to monetary changes, and
the response of prices to nominal GNP changes. The most obvious source
of bias in the coefficient on nominal GNP change, stemming from the
simultaneous increase in prices and in nominal GNP that would occur if
supply shocks were accompanied by an accommodating monetary policy, can
be mitigated by careful attention to the specification of the supply
shift variables (zr).
The tables presented below include not only estimates of (5) with
pricechange as the dependent variable, but also estimates of the same
specification with wage change as the dependent variable. A reduced—
form wage change equation containing the same variables as in (5) can be
derived by solving (2) for w, substituting out using identity (4),
and, finally, substituting (5) for p. Differences in the coefficients
on the same variables in the wage change and price change equations
provide evidence regarding the response of the real wage to demand and
supply disturbances. Since wage changes and nominal GNP changes are
measuredindependently, andare not linked by a simple identity, the
coefficienton nominal GNP change in the wage change equation is less
subjectto simultaneous equations bias and may provide a more reliable
estimate of the "rate of change effect" of aggregate demand.
Estimates of Price and Wage Equations for the U.S.
In this paper, the estimates of (5) for the U.S. attempt to capture
the impact of seven supply shifts, of which six are dummy variables to
capture the impact of separate episodes of government intervention in
the price—and wage—setting process, and the seventh is the annual change13
inthe relative price of food and energy. Except for the "Wagner Act"
variable,the dummy variables are not of the usual "0,1" form. My own
previousresearch on the Nixon controls and the National Recovery Act
finds that both programs not only shifted the price level during their
official period of impact, but caused a shift in the opposite direction
after their termination.'5 The five dummy variables listed in Table 1,
lines 5a, 5b, 5d, 5e, and 5f, are defined to sum to 1.0 during the
period of a program's impact, and to —1.0 during the period after its
termination, thus constraining the impact and rebound efforts to have
exactly the same absolute value. The resulting coefficients on those
dummy variables indicate the cumulative displacement of the price level
during the period of the program's impact. This method implies that,
because these five dummy variables sum to zero, collectively they do not
explain any of the eleven—fold increase in the GNP deflator that
occurred between 1892 and 1980. The sixth dummy variable, representing
the impact of the 1935 Wagner Act on unionization in 1936—37, is of the
usual "0,1" form, and measures the permanent increase in the real wage
achieved by unionization.'6
One obvious method to provide information on parameter shifts would
be to estimate separate versions of (5) for each major sub—period within
the available data set. Most previous investigators have followed this
approach and have concentrated on "normal" peacetime periods, often
omitting the years of the Great Depresssion and World War II. An alter-
native method involves estimating a single equation for the entire
available data period, and then searching for parameter shifts. If
additional variables are defined as the product of the individual
economic variables of interest etc.) and "0,1" dummy14
variables for each sub—period, then the t—ratios on the additional
variables provide estimates of the statistical significance of parameter
shifts.
In developing the equations displayed in Table 1, I followed
this search procedure in an attempt to locate parameter shifts in both
the price and wage equations during the following sub—periods: 1892—
1914, 1915—22, 1929—41, 1942—49, 1950—53, 1954—66, and 1967—80. Only
six shifts could be located; as shown in the table, all six of these are
statistically significant in the wage equation, of which four are also
significant in the price equation.
In the equation for price—change in column (1), the elasticity of
changes in the GNP deflator to current changes in nominal CMI' is stable
at about one—third throughout the sample period, except for significant
upward shifts during World War I (0.34 + 0.54 =0.88)and during World
WarII(0.34 + 0.18 =0.52).Once the effect of price controls is taken
into effect by the method outlined above, it appears that the first—year
division of nominal GNP change between output and prices ranged from
roughly 50—50 to 10—90 in the two wars, considerably above the peacetime
division of 66—34, and far from Okun's estimate of 90—10.
The other variables listed In lines 2 through 4 are all lagged one
year. The coefficient on lagged nominal CNPchangeis quite stable.
There is a significant impact of the lagged output ratio——the
traditional Phillips curve "level effect"——except during the Great
Depression years, 1929—41,whenthe "level effect" was zero.
Onlya small and insignificant "inertia effect" of lagged price
change is evident until 1950,whenthe coefficient exhibits a
significantjump from 0.05 to 0.45. I have previously suggested two
explanations for this shift:15
"it seems quite consistent with a change in attitude in the
first postwar decade toward recognition of a fundamental
change in the stabilizing role of government policy
(initiatives based more on the automatic stabilizers and new
institutions like F.D.I.C. than on countercyclical policy).
The shift also emphasizes the crucial role of three—year
staggered wage contracts, a unique American institution that
dates back to the first postwar decade."17
Unfortunately I can provide no easy explanation for the disappearance of
the Phillips—curve "level effect" during the Great Depression; this
result both describes, and results from, the mysterious absence of
downward price pressure emanating from the huge decade—long real output
gap. It may suggest an asymmetric price response, with more downward
than upward rigidity, but careful testing does not confirm any such asymmetry.
The supply—shift coefficients indicate that World War II price
controls cumulatively held down the price level by almost 20 percent,
and World War I price controls by almost 10 percent, while the NRA
boosted prices by 8 percent.'8 The effects of the Korean war and Nixon
episodes were more modest, but nonetheless large in relation to the
small year—to—year variance of price change during the postwar era. The
Wagner Act had no significant impact on price changes. The effect of
food and energy prices is a marginally significant 0.55.
Taken as a whole, the price—change equation in column (1) has
important implications for current macroeconomic debates. If the sum of
coefficients on nominal rate—of—change variables t' i' and p1)
were unity, the equation would be consistent with the "accelerationist
hypothesis" that a permanent acceleration in nominal GNP growth leads to16
TABLE 1
Equations Explaining Annual Changes in Prices,
Wage Rates, and the Real Wage































































1. Adjusted Nominal GNP(y)
a. Entire Period
b. Extra Effect, 1892—1914
c. Extra Effect, 1915—22
d.Extra Effect, 1942—49
2.Lagged Adjusted Nominal CNP
3.Lagged Real GNP Ratio
a.Entire Period
b. Extra Effect, 1892—1914
c. Extra Effect, 1929—41
4. Lagged !!iet!! Price Change
a. Entire Period
b. Extra Effect, 1950—80
5. Supply Shiftsd
World War I Controls, 1915—22
NRA, 1933—36
Wagner Act, 1936—37
World War II Controls, 1943—47












NOTES TO TABLE 1
a. Asterisks indicate that coefficients are statistically
significant at the 10 percent level (*),5percent level (**),or1
percent level ().
b.Data sources are described in the
c. Lagged price changes are computed
of the supply shift variables. Thus if





where d0 is the coefficient on the relative food—energy price variable
(FE)
d. All dummy variables, except for the Wagner Act, are defined to
sum to unity over the period whenaprogram of government interventIon
was in effect, and to —l during the period of its termination. The NRA,
World War II, and Nixon dummy variables are defined exactly as in
Gordon,"Consistent Characterization," footnote 10. The World War I,
and Korean dummy variables are new:







by netting out the influence
is the level of dummy


















Notes to Table 1 (continued)
e. The variable used to represent changes in the relative price of
food and energy is the difference between the annual rates of change of
the deflators for, respectively, personal consumption expenditures and
personalconsumption expenditures net of expenditures on food and
energy. This variable is available only for 1947—80 and is set equal to
zero before 1947.19
a permanent acceleration of inflation with no residual impact on real
output. For the 1950—80 period the relevant sum of coefficients is 0.89
(0.33 +0.10+ 0.05 + 0.41), which is not far from unity, and this sum
becomes 0.97 when the constant is omitted. Another important implica-
tion is contained in the finding that the coefficients are stable for
the 1950—80 period, leading me to question the unsupported conjectures
by Robert Lucas, William Feilner, and others that a credible return by
monetary policymakers to the regime of the l950s would lead to substan-
tial shifts in parameters.19
An equation explaining annual changes in average hourly earnings is
presented in column (2). All the right—hand variables are identical to
those in column (1). The wage equation exhibits few differences from
the price equation in the coefficients on nominal GNP change (lines 1
and2), and lagged price change (line 4). The nominal GNPresponsive-
ness coefficients in the wage equation exhibit the same overal1 value of
roughly one—third, with the same large and significant upward shift In
WorldWar I and World War II. Further, the coefficients on lagged price
change (line 4) are similar, while lagged nominal GNP change seems to be
somewhat more important in the wage equation.
Perhaps the most surprising result, however, is that the pattern of
wage response to the output ratio is completely different. While the
wage equation shares with the price equation the absence of any impact
of the output ratio in the interval between 1929 and 1941, it differs in
the absence of any impact of the output ratio on wage change over the
"entire period" (line 3a).I would have guessed on the basis of postwar
U.S. evidence that the "rate of change" effect was relatively more
important in the price—change equation, and the "level" effect of the20
output ratio wasmoreimportant in the wage—change equation. In fact,
the opposite appears to be true.
Finally, both the rate—of--change and level effects of aggregate
demand on wages appear to have been substantially more important in the
1892—1914 period than thereafter (lines lb and 3b). This would seem to
be the sole evidence in this paper that, at least for the U.S., the
first—year responsiveness of wages has become more "sticky." Prices, on
the other hand, have exhibited no important peacetime change in behavior
except for (a) the mysterious disappearance of the "level effect" in the
1930s and (b) the emergence of inertia beginning in 1950.
The difference between the coefficients in the wage and price
equations, respectively, indicates the effect of the demand, inertia,
andsupplyvariables on changes in the real product wage. These real—
wage responses are shown separately in column (3), where an equation for
the annual change in the real wage has been estimated in order to pro-
vide measures of statistical significance of the coefficients. Perhaps
the most important finding is that changes in the real wage behave
countercyclically; this is a different relationship than Keynes'
assumption in the General Theory that there is a negative relation
between the level of the real product wage and the level of output. For
Keynes' relation to be validated, we should find a significant negative
impact of the change of real aggregate demand on the change in the real
wage, whereas in fact this coefficient is positive. We can use equation
(5) to recover the reduced form parameters as follows:21
Price Wage Implied Real
Equation Equation Wage Response
Output "level effect" (c2) .32 .02 —.30
"Rate of change effect" (c3) .43 1.02 .58
"Inertia coefficient" (c1)
Pre—1950 .09 .24 .15
Post—1950 .79 .88 .09
Theotherimportant finding in column (3)is that several of the
supplyshift variables have a significant impact on changes in the real
wage. Controls in World WarI,World War II, and the Nixon era, as well
as the NRA, all raised the real wage temporarily (recall that these are
dummies of the l,—l form), while the Wagner Act appears to have raised
the real wage permanently. These coefficients, indicating that govern-
ment intervention has rather consistently operated to shift the
distribution of income toward workers, may help to explain why controls
continue to be popular in public opinion polls. The coefficient in line
5g indicates a unit—elastic negative response of the real wage to the
relative price of food and energy, achieved in part through a positive
response of the price level, and in part through a negative response of
the nominal wage rate.
Estimated Price and Wage Equations for the U.K.
The specification of the U.K. price, wage, and real wage equations
in Table 2 differs from the U.S. equations in only two respects. First,
the lagged change in adjusted nominal GNP (y..1) is insignificant, and
so does not appear in Table 2. Second, there are obvious differences in
theparticular programs of government intervention that require the
introduction of dummy variables. Three periods of freeze or restraint
are included, and in each case the dummy variable is of the "1 ,—l"
form. The choice of timing for the "rebound" or "unwinding" effect of22
TABLE2
Equations Explaining Annual Changes in Prices,
Wage Rates, and the Real Wage







1. Adjusted Nominal GNP
*** a.Entire Period 0.45 0.41k —0.04 b.Extra Effect, 1914—23 0.13 0.l6 0.28
c. Extra Effect, 1955—80 —0.13 0.17 0.30
2. Lagged Real GNPRatio(Q)
a.Entire Period O.24 —0.07
b. Extra Effect, 1914—23 0.45 O.67 0.23
c. Extra Effect, 1924—38 —0.l0 —0.25 —0.14
d.Extra Effect, 1955—80 0.89 0.86 —0.03
3. Lagged Price Change (pt_l)c
** *** a.Entire Period 0.ll 0.35
b. Extra Effect, 1955—80 0.45 0.05 —0.36
4. Supply Shifts d
a. Late 1960s Intervention (1967—72) —l.72 —5.05
b.Early 1970s Intervention (1973—75) —5.39 —3.12
c. Social Contract (1977—80) —0.67 —10.33 —9.65 d.Foreign Exchange Ratee —0.08 —0.16 0.09
*
5.Constant Term
a. Entire Period —0.l8 0.34
b. Extra Effect, 1955—80 1.60 1.91 0.31
R2 .932 .938 .536
S.E.E. 1.91 1.95 2.0723
NOTES TO TABLE 2
a, b, c. Same as Table 1.
d. All dummy variables are defined to sum to unity over the period
when a program of government intervention was in effect, and to —l
during the period of its termination. The variables are defined as
follows:
Late 1960s Early l970s Social
Intervention Intervention Contract
1967 0.33 1973 1.0 1977 1.0
1968 0.33 1975 —1.0 1978 —0.6
1969 0.33 1979 —0.2
1970 —0.33 1980 —0.2
1971 —0.33
1972 —0.33
e. The foreign exchange rate included in percentage change form, is
the pound—dollar rate for 1900—70, and the effective exchange rate of the
pound for 1971—80. See data appendix.24
the control programs is based on the same iterative method used in my
research for the U.S.; residuals from a first iteration were used to
determine the length of time required for the control effect to wear
off.
The U.K. price—change equation In column (1) displays a number of
similarities to the corresponding U.S. equation, and a few interesting
differences. The similarities begin with the stable coefficient on
nominal GNP change with a TJ.K. coefficient in the current year of
0.45, compared to U.S. coefficients in the current and first lagged year
summing to 0.43. The "entire period" coefficient on the lagged output
ratio, as well as the shift toward increased inertia in the postwar
period, seem to be consistent with U.S. behavior. The major differences
are the absence of a significant upward shift on the y coefficient for
the U.K. during World War I, and the enormous upward shift in the U.K.
output ratio coefficient in the postwar years (line 2d).
It is the wage equation where U.K. behavior contrasts dramatically
with the U.S. First, there is a substantially larger impact effect of
nominal GNP changes on wage changes in the postwar U.K. than in the
postwar U.S. My more detailed analysis of wage responsiveness, based on
bivariate Cranger causality tests for quarterly data, reached the same
conclusion.20 In Table 2 the contrast showsup not just in the higher
U.K. nominal GNP coefficient (line la plus. ic), but even more strongly
in the large upward shift in the U.K. postwar coefficient on the output
ratio (line 2d). Another contrast is in the inertia effect, which
shifted upward substantially in U.S. data in the postwar years, but
which shows no upward postwar shift in the U.K. from its "entire period"
coefficient of 0.35. Overall, the U.K. results are consistent with the25
long—runneutrality of nominalCNPchanges in the postwar period; the
relevant sums of coefficients on the nominal GNP and lagged price varia-
bles are 0.88 in the price equation (0.45—0.13+0.11+0.45) and 0.98 in
the wage equation (0.41+0.17+0.35+0.05).
The supply shift variables introduce another interesting contrast
withthe U.S. ,sincethe "Late 1960s" and "Social Contract" interven-
tionsreduced the real wage temporarily, in contrast to the U.S. inter-
ventionprograms that consistently increased the real wage. Another
interesting contrast is the peculiar response of the real wage to
exchange rate changes——a devaluation (treated as a negative change In
the exchange rate) increases U.K. wage change more than price change,
leading to an increase in the real wage. Exchange rate effects for the
U.S., although important in quarterly data for the 1970s, do not have a
significant impact on the annual data and thus are omitted from Table
1.21 In the opposite direction, changes in the relative price of food
and energy, although important in the U.S. equations, did not make a
significant contribution in the equations for the U.K. and Japan, and
are thus omitted in both Tables 2 and 3.
Estimated Price and Wage Equations for Japan
The equations for Japan in Table 3 have fewer variables than those
for the U.S. and U.K., both because fewer significant parameter shifts
wereidentified, and because no significant impact was found for changes
in the relative price of food and energy nor in the exchange rate. The
price—changeequation for Japan in column (1) suggests substantially26
TABLE 3
Equations Explaining Annual Changes in Prices,
Wage Rates, and the Real Wage
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a,b Same as Table 1.
NOTES TO TABLE 327
greater price flexibility than in either the U.S. or U.K., with large
and significant "entire period" coefficients of price change onboth
currentnominal GNPchangeand on the lagged output ratio. The upward
shift in price responsiveness during World War I, which was reflected in
a higher coefficient onnominal GNP changefor the IJ.S., is reflected
herein a higher coefficient on the lagged output ratio for Japan (line
2c). There is no evidence of price inertia in the price equation in the
entireperiod nor in any subperiod.
Japan,unlike the UK. and U.S., exhibits virtually no responsive-
ness of prices (nor wages) to changes in nominal GNP nor to the lagged
output ratio before 1914 (lines lb and 2b). This fact, together with
the high standard errors in these equations compared to those for the
U.S. and U.K., suggests to me that there may be substantial measurement
errors in the early Japanese data. Controlling for this low responsive-
ness before 1914, as in Table 3, there seems little doubt that the price
deflator in peacetime periods after World War I was considerably more
flexible and less inertia—bound in Japan than in the U.S. or U.K.
Thereare two differences between the wage and price equations for
Japan, and these show up as significant coefficients in the real wage
equationin column (3).First, the rate of change effect in the wage
equationis negative, reflecting the fact that an expansion in the
economy is associated with a decline in the real wage. Second, there
seems to be a somewhat larger impact of lagged prices in the wage equa-
tion than in the price equation. The extremely high significance level
of the constant shift term for 1961—73 in the wage and real wage
equations demonstrates the importance of allowing every parameter to
change, including the constant. The implication, of course, is that the28
explosive productivity growth enjoyed by the Japanese economy was a
temporary phenomenon, since after 1973 real wage growth returned approx-
imatelyto the average rates experienced before 1940.
Comparison with Okun's Theoretical Framework
The characterization of historical price and wage behavior in the
three tables differs substantially from Okun's algebraic theory, as







where the "C" superscript on price change refers to non—auction or
"customer" market sector. Otherwise, Okun and I both use the same
notation.
To simplify the discussion, I first compare (6) and (7) to the
results for the U.S. obtained in Table 1, since this was the nation that
most concerned Okun, and subsequently comment on the relation of (6) and
(7) to the results for the U.K. and Japan. At least four important
differences are immediately apparent between Okun's framework and ray
description of U.S. data. First, the wage equation (6) embodies Okun's
basic theme, that the inflation process is propelled by "wage—wage"
inertia. In contrast, the wage equation in Table 1 reflects my long—
standing empirical finding that wage changes in the postwar U.S. exhibit
feedback from lagged product prices, not lagged wage rates.22 When asingle lagged wage change term is added to the equation in column (2),
its coefficient is 0.05 with a t—ratio of 0.4. Additional shift; terms
for 1929—41 and 1950—80 are also insignificant.
The second difference is that Okun's model allows only a "rate—of—
change effectt' in the influence of aggregate demand on wage and price
change, whereas the equations in Table 1 also include the traditional
Phillips curve "level effect." Third, Okun obtains a relationship
between price change and lagged nominal CNP change in (7) by assuming
that p =w_1.This specification is strongly rejected by the U.S.
data; when current and lagged wage changes are added to the price equa-
tion, their coefficients range from 0.05 to 0.08, with t—ratios below
unity, and with no evidence of significant structural shift param-
eters. This is a finding that is directly relevant to our subsequent
discussion of the product market, since the U.S. results in Table 1,
column (1) indicate that there is a strong contemporaneous effect of
nominal GNP change, with an added impact of the lagged level of real
GNP, implying that product prices are not simply set as a mark—up over
labor cost. Finally, there is no room in Okun's model for the major
parameter shifts that occurred during the two wars, nor any explanation
of the shift from zero to positive inertia in the inflation process
after World WarII.
Theresults for the U.K. and Japan compound the conflict between
Okun's analysis and the facts are presented in the tables. In those two
countries, wages are far from sticky, and at least for the postwar
years, the main impact of aggregate demand on wage behavior works
through the output ratio variable that is omitted from (6) and (7).
There is no evidence at all of wage—wage inertia in the postwar results30
for the U.K. and Japan, relatively little feedback from lagged prices to
wages, and no evidence of Okun's mechanical unit—elastic markup relation
between current changes in customer market prices and lagged changes in
wage rates. Yet all of the features involved in Okun's theory——the
Ittollit that produces career labor markets and the information lags that
generate the shopping model of customer markets——are shared on common by
all three countries and most historical eras.
Limitations of the Results
There are numerous questions that may be raised about the results
displayed in Table 1. There are good reasons to think that the coeffi-
cient on current nominal GNP change is biased upward. When the U.S.
equation is re—estimated for the postwar years with the fixed—weight
deflator rather than the implicit deflator as dependent variable, the
coefficient on nominal GNP change drops from 0.34 to about 0.20,
indicating that part of the current—year nominal GNP impact may be a
spurious weighting effect. Table 1 retains the implicit deflator
throughout, simply because the fixed—weight deflator is not available
for the prewar years, and a shift in the concept used as dependent
variable would prevent any analysis of historical shifts in
coefficients. Similarly, the U.S. wage rate series used in columns (2)
and (3) is average hourly earnings, not the postwar index that adjusts
for changes in overtime and interindustry employment shifts. Thus part
of the response of wages to current nominal GNP changes in Table 1
represents a change in overtime and the employment mix, not a change in
actual wage rates. Again, comparability prevents a shift in indexes for
the postwar.31
The possibility that the demand responsiveness coefficients may be
biased upward in the results for the U.S., and possibly for the U.K. and
Japan as well, limits the usefulness of the empirical results for the
analysis of hypothetical future policy changes. The point of the
analysis is to use relatively homogeneous data sources across time and
to identify shifts in parameters; we are interested in the fact that
U.S. prices were more flexible during 1915—22 than before or after, for
instance, not the precise quantitative values of the responsiveness
parameters. The results are intended to pose a challenge for theorists,
not to be used as they stand for short—term forecasting. A better job
of identifying the crucial parameters for short intervals, e.g., 1954—
80, can be performed with quarterly data and a more complex specifica-
tion.2332
III. WAGES, CONTRACrS,AND
THEMYSTERY OF THE MISSING ESCALATOR
Okun's book contains many insights about microeconomic behavior in
labor and product markets, but lacks a theoretical explanation for some
of the phenomenadescribed in the preceding empirical analysis. The
restof the paper contains some conjectures and speculations about the
lines that theorists might fruitfully pursue, with Part III devoted to
labor markets, and Part IV devoted to product markets.
Explaining Cross—Country Differences in Nominal Wage Flexibility
The previous section provided evidence that wage changes in the
U.S., U.K., and Japan, have not been characterized by wage—wage inertia,
andthatnominalaggregate demand influences wage changes through three
channels——through the impact of (1)currentchanges in nominal spending,
(2)the output ratio, and (3)thefeedback from lagged product prices,
whichmay represent the combined impactof labor demand on the value of
labor'smarginal product, and of COLAescalationon previously
negotiated union wages.24
Wage adjustments in postwar Britain and Japan have been more
responsive to aggregate demand, and less characterized by inertia, than
in the postwar U.S. If the U.S. institution of three—year overlapping
wage contracts is cited as an explanation of some or all of this differ-
ence in behavior, then an explanation must be provided as to why
contract form and length differ among countries that all share long—term
labor—market attachments. The fact that Japan can simultaneously
achieve lifetime employment (at least for males under 55 in large
firms), together with relatively flexible nominal wages, presents a33
powerful challenge to proponents of the "career—labor—market--wage—wage—
inertia" theory.25
My explanation of differences in contract form and length is based
on the simple idea, developed by Joanna Gray, Ronald Dye, and others,
that the choice of contract length, like most economic choices, involves
a balancing of costs and benefits.26 Long contracts allow a greater
period for the amortization of negotiation and strike costs, while short
contracts allow agents quickly to adjust to unanticipated nominal and
real events. This balancing act will tend to lead to a long contract
length in a society like the U.S., with its history of labor strife
(particularly between 1935—41 and 1946—48), and a short contract length
in Japan, with its tradition of conflict avoidance, on—the—job social
equality, and the non—occupational nature of attitudes toward
hierarchy.27
But both short and long contracts may be fully indexed to a nominal
variable like consumer prices, nominal GNP, or a monetary aggregate.
The literature on contracts, in fact, views short contracts as a viable
substitute for long—contracts—cum—indexing, when low negotiation costs
allow short contract lengths to evolve as the dominant form. Thus a
central issue in the origin of macroeconomic fluctuations is the absence
of full indexation of wages and the product prices of individual firms.
The Missing Escalator28
What range of possible contingencies will be written into
contracts? Asymmetric information mitigates against contracts contin-
gent on "local" variables specific to the firm, e.g., firm sales,
product price, or worker productivity. Any informational advantage on34
the part of the employer leads to a moral hazard problem, that the firm
hasan incentive to understate the realization of the variable on which
the wage is contingent, in order to minimize wage cost. Contracts are
thus more likely to be contingent on aggregate nominal variables, i.e.,
the consumer price index and/or the money supply. But as Gray has
shown, indexation to a consumer price index rigidifies real wage growth
over the life of the contract. While this is an optimal outcome if all
disturbances are nominal, and the growth of productivity is perfectly
predictable, full consumer—price indexation imposes an efficiency loss
when an unpredictable supply shock (e.g., OPEC) changes the equilibrium
real wage.
Since full indexation to the consumer price index has the fatal
defect that it rigidifies the real wage, an appealing alternative is
indexation to nominal GNP, for this allows the real wage to adjust
automatically to unexpected changes in productivity growth (the advan-
tages and disadvantages of indexation to a nominal monetary aggregate
are treated below). Adopting the notation in Part I above, with changes
in nominal GNP, prices, actual real GNP, and equilibrium real GNP desig-
nated respectively as y, p, q, and q*, we have the identity:
(8) y —q*=÷q—q*•
Let us assume for convenience that equilibrium labor input is constant,
so labor productivity growth in equilibrium is the same as equilibrium
real GNP growth (q*)• Then indexation of the wage rate to nominal GNP
(w =y)implies, when substituted into (5):35
(9) w -p=q*+ (q -q*)•
Thus growth in the real wage (w —p)automatically reflects equilibrium
productivity growth (q*) as long asthereare no fluctuations in real
output relative to its equilibrium value (q —q*=0).
No matter how superficially attractive, nominal GNP indexing of
wage contracts has never been observed. This occurs, I suggest, because
four sets of barriers prevent agents from making the comfortable assump-
tion that real business cycles have been vanquished (q —q*=0)and
therefore in (9) that the growth of the real wage mimics the growth of
productivity. The barriers are (1) pre—set prices and wages, (2)
foreign trade, (3) information imperfections and delays, and (4)
velocity shifts.
(1) Pre—set prices and wages. Firms have a legitimate reason to
fear that nominal GNP fluctuations will, at least initially, take the
form of real GNP fluctuations. First, in many markets it is efficient
for prices to be pre—set rather than established in auction markets, to
save on the time and transportation costs that centralized auctions
impose (see Part IV below). Second, prices that are preset for even a
short interval imply that firms will initially experience a nominal
fluctuation as a real event——a decline in real purchases at the
initially pre—set price. Their expectation that the real demand shock
will soon be eliminated depends on the speed with which costs of inputs
purchased from otherfirms mimic the iioveiaent in nominal demand. If
informationon the nominal shock is imperfect, firms may, at least
initially, interpret it as local rather than aggregate in nature and may
believe that there is no reason for their input costs to move in propor—36
tion to the demand shift. Once it is admitted that individual product
prices, and hence the aggregate price level, may adjust gradually to
changes in nominal CNP, then workers will fear the consequences of
nominal—indexed wage contracts. Consider a 20 percent decline in
nominal CNP, accompanied initially by only a 10 percent decline in the
aggregate price level. Workers having a wage contract indexed to
nominal GNP would experience a decline in their real wage of 10
percent. Eventually prices would adjust fully in proportion to the
nominal GNP change, but workers, particularly if they are risk averse,
would object to the instability of real wages implied by nominal—GNP
indexation in a world of gradual price adjustment.
The preceding paragraph is unconventional in that it deduces
nominal wage stickiness from price stickiness, while it is more common
to do the reverse. But in fact the argument works boh'ways. If
nominal wages do not adjust instantly, then firms face nominal marginal
costs that are less than unit elastic with respect to nominal GNP
changs. The problem is properly treated as dynamic rather than static,
in which several sources of resistance to full nominal iridexation inter-
act and reinforce each other.
(2) Foreign trade. When firms observe an increase or decrease in
their real sales at the initially pre—set price, their choice of a new
price depends on a guess about the fraction of the demand shift
representing a nominal aggregate shock, as opposed to a real aggregate
or real local shock, and, a guess about the extent to which suppliers of
inputs recognize the aggregate component of the shock. As will be,
recognized by economists in Britain, Japan, and other open economies,
the perceived stickiness of marginal cost is a rational response when37
agents recognize that a substantial fraction of their inputs is imported
from abroad, where suppliers may have been unaffected by an aggregate
nominal demand shock that is national rather than international in
origin. Full insulation of real sales from a perceived nominal national
disturbance would require that each agent (a) assumes his national
suppliers immediately perceive the same shock and (b) ignores the fact
that suppliers of imports are unaffected by a national demand shock.
Both (a) and (b) surely strain credulity.
(3) Information imperfections and delays. Prior to the postwar
development of monetary aggregates and national income accounts, timely
measures of nominal aggregates did not exist, as good a reason as any to
explain why nominal aggregate indexation has never occurred. Even
today, nominal GNP indexatlon would require a two—month average delay in
the U.S. (data for the second quarter, centered on May 15, become avail-
able in the third weelc of July). Lags are considerably longer in some
other countries. Wage contracts indexed to nominal GNP thus cannot
prevent a short—run reduction in hours worked in situations when nominal
GNP growth suddenly decelerates, as In the U.S. in l980:Q2 and
1981:Q2. Profit—maximizing firmsnaturallyresist the Implications of
nominal GNP indexation that, because of information lags in situations
of temporary fluctuations of nominal GNP growth, they reduce prices just
when the economy is recovering and raise prices just when it is collaps-
ing.
(4) Velocity shifts. Information on monetary aggregates is
available fairly promptly, but indexation to a particular monetary
aggregate cannot insulate real variables even if information is contem-
poraneous. Stochastic disturbances In commodity and money demand38
functions,which may be serially correlated, lead to serially correlated
fluctuations in the velocity of money. A price—setting agent choosing
to index his product price to Ml in the U.S. would find that a slump in
real sales would occur in any week or month in which velocity grows more
slowlythan the average written into the indexation formula.
Contractual arrangements cannot obviate fluctuations of hours
workedin response to fluctuations in real supply or in nominal
demand. Firms and workers are both unwilling to accept the risk implied
by a contract that is fully indexed to nominal spending or money. If it
is impossible to eliminate fluctuations in nominal demand, then labor—
market contracts should be of relatively short duration. Frequent
contract renewals can partially substitute for the absence of nominal
GNP indexation, by allowing the latest information on both real and
nominal shocks to be incorporated into wage—setting and price—setting
decisions.
Indexation and Product—Market Adjustment
The preceding discussion, which has emphasized the obstacles to
full indexation of labor contracts, would appear to apply with much more
force to product markets. Yearly, monthly, and even daily adjustments
in relative prices must be accomplished by the price system if it is to
perform its traditional job of efficient resource allocation. Thus
long—term product contracts that index the nominal price to an aggregate
index, while maintaining fixed relative product prices, are rarely
observed. Because in most historical eras the variance of relative
prices has been greater than that of the aggregate price level, agents
have relied on short contract lengths to perform required adjustments in39
relative prices, and have been able to eschew formal indexation to
aggregate variables, in theknowledgethat a near—term contract revision
would allow incorporation of any relevant aggregate information.
The cost—benefit approach to explaining contract length would also
point out that, while there are much greater disturbances in product
markets that would warrant a short contract, there are also much smaller
negotiation costs. While strikes are a frequent event in labor markets,
there are no "strikes" by suppliers who are unwilling to provide inter-
mediate goods. If a final goods producer is unwilling to accede to a
supplier's price "demand," then the supplier will either make a price
concession or take his goods elsewhere, depending on his expectations
about future demand. Other reasons for the absence of supplier strikes
may be legal institutions that prevent supplier collusion but encourage
worker collusion, and the fact that most suppliers produce multiple
products while most workers do not.
The absence of complete indexation of product prices to nominal
demand disturbances opens the way to output fluctuations. This would
not matter if all product prices were set in auction markets, with
supply and demand equated continually. Nor would it matter if firms
could "see through" the fog of information on nominal aggregate demand
provided every day by the newspaper, and could believe with certainty
that eachsupplier and customer could "see through" to the same true
state of affairs. Thus the operational tasks for product—market theor-
ists are, first, to explain why prices for all products are not set on
auction markets, and why firms do not and cannot insulate the real
economy from nominal disturbances. Okun's book makes a good start on
these two questions, but there is more to be said on each one.40
IV. THE RESPONSE OF PRICES TO DEMAND SHOCKS WHEN PRICES ARE PRESET
Why Prices are Pre—Set
My analysis of product market behavior rests firmly on the same
foundation as Okun's; the prices of at least some products must be pre—
set for a finite period of time. When combined with the shopping model
that Okun formulated, the need to form expectations about the costs of
goods provided by suppliers (a factor I have stressed), and the lack of
complete Indexation, the assumption that prices are pre—set can explain
the sluggish adjustment that we sometimes observe in product markets.
While some commentators find that the need for pre—setting of prices is
too obvious a phenomenon to warrant serious attention, two arguments
persuade me that there is a need for a careful analysis. First, a whole
tradition has developed in macroeconomics in the last decade that is
based on the behavior of "yeoman barbers" who, like ttyeoin farmers,"
are price takers who receive signals from some distant auction market
and who, like barbers, produce a service. However attractive for its
tractability, this analytical approach impedes understanding by provid-
ing no explanation of price tags, and by ignoring the consequence of
decentralization in breaking the link between common information and
firm behavior.
Heterogeneity is crucial for the theory of price adjustment,
because it explains the coexistence of auction markets and price—setting
markets. In describing auction markets, Okun (p. 134) states "those
commodities traded on auction markets have a large number of producers
and of potential buyers; they are homogeneous or readily gradable; and
typically they are storable at relatively low cost." My explanation of41
price—setting differs from Okun's only by placing more emphasis on
heterogeneity of time and space in product markets, and less on the
homogeneity of the product itself. Retail transactions are
characterized by a large number of customers making brief individual
visits to different locations, in contrast to the Board of Trade, where
each trader remains continuously at his post throughout the day. In
contrast to the empty supermarket, the essence of a spot—auction market
is its liquidity, which can only be achieved if many buyers and sellers
are present simultaneously. When price tags are pre—set rather than
continually changed, as in an auction, goods and services can be made
available at conveniently dispersed locations and with a purchase time
that is at the discretion of the buyer.
How might a theorist go about building a model to explain the
prevalence of price—setting practices? Leaving aside for a moment
markets involving manufacturers and wholesalers, he might begin by
adopting Gary Becker's treatment of consumption goods as a combination
of marketed items and time.29 For an analysis of markets, the crucial
contribution of time is not in the need for time in actual consumption,
as when watching television, but rather in the requirement for time to
make purchases. On this issue, I like Alan Blinder's subjective
reflectionof why, when he goes to get stationery from the office supply
cabinet, he does not "take just what he needs for the next day (or hour
or minute). It is not because there is a large transportation cost, nor
becausethere is bookkeeping to do, nor because the office secretary
charges you a 'toll' for the privilege. Rather, it is because each trip
to the cabinet occupies some of your time——valuable time that you could
spend on something else."3° Although Blinder was interested in42
managerial costs of adjusting inventories by retail firms,timeis just
as relevant in the shopping decisions of their customers. Our theorist
might do well to begin with an explicit niodel of the resource costs of
the shopping process, including both time and distance. The distingui-
shing feature of retail markets, as compared to centralized auction
markets, is that the ratio of the value of shopping time to the value of
the average transaction is relatively large. Further, the fact that
people arid their furniture do take up space, even when crammed closely
together as in Manhattan, means that a costly trip is required to buy
anything.
Space and time may be convincing as factors requiring decentraliza-
tion of retail markets, with the resulting loss of liquidity that is an
essential prerequisite for an auction market. But these considerations
should be less important in sales by manufacturers to wholesalers, and
by wholesalers to retailers. Here the contrast between the vegetable
market and auto—parts market is instructive. Heterogeneity of product
must be the key element that explains the existence of price—setting,
for how else are we to explain the central role in most wholesale firms
and purchasing departments of the printed catalogue detailing the
myriads of available products? The market for a rear trunk lid for a
1969 Plymouth four—door sedan delivered on a Wednesday in 1981 in
Evanston, Illinois, is a rather thin one, lacking the liquidity and
central location necessary for an auction to take place. Pre—set prices
in a catalogue allow transaction times and locations to be freely chosen
and thus increase economic efficiency. In the case of the 1969 Plymouth
trunk lid, printed prices help the Evanston body shop and the State Farm
insurance adjuster located ten miles away to base their allocative43
decisions on the same information.
Some theorists might insist that the parts catalogue should be
indexed to some nominal aggregate number, so that prices can be marked
up each day or month by a fixed parameter that Is announced in the
newspaper. Recent visitors claim that they have seen this done in
Tel Aviv restaurants. But to search so far for an example of this
practice is to identify the phenomenon that prevents it from becoming
widespread, and this is the low historical variance of aggregate nominal
indexes as compared to relative prices. Phillip Cagan's charts document
the wide dispersion of price changes in recessions for WPI commodity
categories; presumably the dispersion of price changes for individual
products is even greater.3' Because relative prices change all the
time, fixed—parameter indexation does not obviate the reprinting of
catalogues. And if catalogues must be reprinted (and this is done
separately, page by page, in the wholesale business), why should firms
bother with indexing except in extraordinary macroeconomic conditions?
Specialists in industrial organization may be surprised to learn
that such elementary phenomena as price—setting practices are still
under discussion by macroeconomists. Industrial organization, at least
as I learned it,32 would collapse as a sub—discipline if it were
stripped of product heterogeneity and pre—set prices. Product hetero-
geneity, which is ruled out in the new classical "yeoman barber" models,
is central not only to an understanding of price—setting, but also of
the basic economic concepts of the industry, the firm, and the
product. Classic definitions of industries rest on distinctions that
revolve around the similarity of products or production processes. The
existence of the firm has been explained as a way of economizing on44
transactions costs when heterogeneous labor, capital, and materials must
be brought together to produce a given range of products. And anyone
involved in antitrust cases knows that the ability of firms to pre—set
prices is assumed from the beginning, while some of the arguments depend
on the definition of product classes or individual products within a
vast sea of heterogeneity.
Modeling the Demand Responsiveness of Prices as a Varying Rather than
Fixed Parameter
The shopping model and kinked demand curve that play the central
role in Okun's chapter on product markets constitute only the beginning
of an adequate analysis. Okun has no explanation for a varying
responsiveness of prices to changes in nominal aggregate demand, as is
exhibited above in Part II, and has occurred in Latin America, Israel,
and in various hyperinflations. When provoked, business firms are
capable of changing prices very fast. A step forward can be made when
we allow the firm to become Janus—faced, looking not only forward in the
input—output table toward its customers, but also at the same time
backward toward its suppliers. The one—sided forward—looking nature of
Okun's analysis is symbolized by his Figure 4—2 on p. 177, which has the
demand curve shifting along a constant cost curve. For macroeconomic
analysis the central question is, "what factors can be invented to
provide a rigorous explanation of the fact that, in the face of public
information on nominal aggregate demand, the demand and cost curves
faced by a firmdonot generally move in proportion?"
The key ingredients in an explanation are, first, a distinction
between aggregate and local shocks, and, second, a multiplicity of
piecesof available information about nominal aggregate demand that45
creates ambiguity about the exact value of current changes. A third
ingredient is decentralization combined with imperfect information. The
one—good yeoman barber model misses the main point if, through the usual
methods of solving models with rational expectations, every agent can
casually assume that everyone else is just like him. John Anderson
called Reaganomics "economics with mirrors." Yet homogeneous one—good
structures are really "models with mirrors," in which agents look around
and see only themselves.
Inthinking about the sources of gradual price adjustrnert in a
recession, in which agents have a lot of current information about
nominal aggregate demand (information which is dispersed around an ever—
changingmean), it has always seemed to methat the fundamental source
ofstickiness involves input costs. For a moment let's ignore labor
input and concentrate on materials. Our Janus—faced firmmustpay for
materials, and this must limit its flexibility in lowering its product
price in the face of a perceived drop in nominal demand. In 1980,
Chrysler could have offered rebates of 50 percent, instead of 10
percent, if only the cost of steel and other materials had cooperatively
dropped by 50 percent in the second quarter of 1980. But our firmlooks
backinto the murky recesses of the input—output table and sees only
risk. If the steel firmdoesn'tcut price because it perceives a sticky
priceof coal or oil, then a unilateral 50 percent cut in the price of
Chryslerautos would lead to bankruptcy even faster than would occur
with a smaller price cut.
In contrast to models with mirrors, the essence of the price adju-
stment problem comes closer to models of public goods, with their
prisoner's dilemmas and free—rider problems. Each agent must realize46
its fundamental vulnerability, in the absence of a central coordinating
authority, because an initial move to cut price——if followed by com-
petitors but not by suppliers——may lead to bankruptcy. The problem is
the same in labor markets. No single agent will be willing to agree to
a unilateral wage cut when he knows that the cost of its market basket
depends on the wages of everyone else.
One reaction to the cost—based story points to an alleged "sunk"
nature of input costs. If Chrysler has already bought the steel, the
fact that the steel was constructed at the higher cost level of an
earlier period is irrelevant. Only demand considerations should govern
the price. In the limit, this view must regard all costs as fixed over
the discrete length of time during which prices are pre—set, and it thus
ignores the numerous day—by—day adjustments to input quantity that a
firmcanachieve. More basically, it ignores the speculative element
involved in holding inventories. The firm may choose to hold the steel,
rather than converting it into autos at distress—sale prices, if it
believes that conditions will improve next period. This "reluctance to
produce"might be interpreted as voluntary underproduction In a model
with mirrors. But ittranslatesinto sticky final—goods prices in fact,
and is just enough tocreate the wedge between effective and notional
demand curves that Barro, Grossman, and Malinvaud need to carry out
their "fixprice" analysis.
Thestory about sunk costs makes itclear that a formal model of
thisproblem must specify quite carefullythe kinds of precommitments
that firms must make as regards input prices and quantities. And it
must specify the timing of firm output and price decisions in relation
to the availability of information about nominal demand. Since real—47
world firms with pre—set prices must initially learn of a demand
surprise through real events——the non—appearance of expected customers
and the unexpected buildup of inventories——the model must require firms
to set the price before they learn the "news." Without costless
communication to every supplier, and every supplier's supplier (both
here and abroad), the firm is likely to respond in the next period with
an adjustment that partly takes the form of lower production, and partly
of lower sales prices. With nothing special on the front page of the
daily newspaper, the adjustment may be weighted toward production, but
with screaming headlines that a wartime enemy has surrendered, the
adjustment may be weighted toward prices.
I suspect that some progress may be possible in building models of
a Janus—faced firmbycareful specification of the sequential learning
process. Imagine that a firm presets its output price and purchases
materials one week at a time. At the end of week 1 it receives initial
information about its local demand shock, in the form of a buildup or
reduction in inventories (and/or unfilled orders) compared to its
initial plan. At the same time it may receive a new price list from one
or more suppliers arid can begin to form an inference about the state of
aggregate demand. News about the state of aggregate demand Is not
receivedas a neat package, but rather in the form of bits of informa-
tionarriving week after week. Our firmmight learn at the end of week
2of the Business Week index for week 1, and at the end of week 3 the
unemploymentrate and index of industrial production for week 1.
Because all of these information sources about both local andaggregate
demand are noisy, several weeks are likely to be observed beforemajor
changesin plans are made. Sluggish price adjustment mayemerge from48
this process under normal peacetime conditions if firms wait for price
cuts by suppliers before feeling that it is safe to cut prices substan-
tially in response to a perceived dip in aggregate demand, while
suppliers wait to cut prices until their assessment ofthe current
aggregate demand situation is confirmed by a reductionin orders from
final goods producers. The more rapid adjustment of prices during
wartime may stem from the role of dramatic political and military news
in cutting through the normal drawn—out sequential learning process.49
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that the historical experience of the last
century reveals a number of different patterns of price and wage ad just—
ment. In the postwar U.S. prices and wages respond modestly to the
level andchangein aggregate demand, with a substantial role for
inertia. Inothertimes and places, however, prices and wages have
respondedin greater degree to the change and level of aggregate demand,
and have been less influenced by inertia. Prices and wages were
particularlyflexible in the U.S. during World War I and its aftermath,
in Japan after 1914, and in the postwar U.K.
Some of these changes in behavior seem to have plausible explana-
tions. For instance, the theoretical ideas sketched in the last section
mayhave some potential for explaining thegreater degree of price
responsiveness in the U.S. during World War I. The postwar inertia in
the U.S. as contrasted with the U.K. and Japan, seems consistent with
the interpretation that the unique U.S. institution of three—year
staggered wage contracts plays a central role in price and wage
dynamics. Other changes in behavior are more mysterious. The "output
level" impact of aggregate demand on price and wage changes seems to
have disappeared in the U.S. between 1929 and 1941, and in the U.K.
between 1924 and 1938. This merely restates what we already knew, that
high unemployment in those episodes did not lead to the expected down-
ward adjustment in prices and wages. Yet tests not reported here
decisively reject the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment.
Neither the empirical estimates nor the theoretical suggestions
contained in this paper are intended as final answers. Parameters
estimated from a century of annual data should not be used to make50
precise assessments of current policy issues, but rather should be
regarded as providing some rough guidelines regarding the frequency and
magnitude of parameter shifts that seem to characterize the price and
wage adjustment process in different countries. Interpretationof
policy mistakes in past historical episodes, and estimates of the impact
offuturepolicy actions, requires more careful attention to shorter
periodsusing quarterly or monthly data, and indexes of price and wage
changes that distinguish between shifts in outputandemployment mix
fromactual changes in individual prices and wage rates. The research
agenda for econometricians and theorists seems, as always, to be a full
one.51
FOOTNOTES
1. Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1981, P. 42.
2. Milton Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American
EconomicReview, vol. 58 (March 1968), pp. 1—17; Robert E. Lucas, "Some
International Evidence on Output—Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic
Review, vol. 63 (June 1973), pp. 326—34; Martin N. Baily, "Wages and
Unemployment Under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, vol.
41 (January 1974), pp. 37—50.
3. The best exposition remains Robert J. Barro and Herschel I.
Grossman, Money, Employment, and Inflation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976), especially Chapter 2.
4. Arthur M. Okun, Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic
Analysis, Washington: Brookings, 1981.
5. My overall assessment thus coincides with Edmund S. Phelps,
"Okun's Macro—Micro System: An Appraisal," Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 19 (September 1981), pp. 1065—77.
6.Arthur M. Okun, "Efficient Disinflationary Policies," American
Economic Review, vol. 68 (May 1978), pp. 348—52.
7.Thomas J.Sargent, "The Ends of Four Big Inflations", NBER
Conferencepaper 90, 1981.
8.Robert J.Gordon, "The Demand for andSupply of Inflation,"
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 18 (December 1975), pp. 807—36.
9. Robert J. Gordon, "Output Fluctuations and Gradual Price
Adjustment,"Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 19(June 1981), pp.
492—530.
10. Robert J. Gordon, "WhyU.S.Wage and Employment Behavior52
Differs from that in Britain and Japan," Economic Journal, vol. 92
(March 1982), PP. 000—00.
11. George L. Perry, "Changing Labor Markets and Inflation,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 3, 1970, pp. 411—41.
12. The specification in equation (3) has been tested for postwar
U.S. quarterly data, using Perry's weighted unemployment rate instead of
the output ratio, in my "Inflation, Flexible Exchange Rages, and the
Natural Rate of Unemployment," NBER working paper no. 708, July 1981,
forthcoming in Martin N. Baily, ed., Workers, Jobs, and Inflation
(Washington: Brookings, 1982). That paper is the source of the
estimates of postwar natural real GNP used to generate the postwar
annual output ratio series used in the current paper; it also tests and
accepts the restrictions assumed in (3), that lagged wage changes are
absent; and, finally, it allows changes in standard productivity to
depend partially on the evolution of actual productivity behavior.
13. The specification written as equation (2) below was first
estimated in "A Consistent Characterization of a Near—Century of Price
Behavior," American Economic Review, vol. 70, (May 1980), pp. 243—9.
Subsequently the same approach has been used with quarterly data to test
the Lucas—Sargent—Wallace policy ineffectiveness proposition in "Price
Inertia andPolicyIneffectiveness in the United States, 1890—1980,"
NBER working paper no. 744, September 1981.
14. While a sum of coefficients of unity is consistent with the
accelerationist hypothesis, a sum of coefficients below unity does not
necessarily conflict with that hypothesis, an important point originally
made in Thomas J. Sargent, "A Note on the Accelerationist Controversy,"
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 3 (August 1971), pp. 721—5.53
15. The most recent evaluation of controls is contained in Jon Frye
and Robert J. Gordon, "Government Intervention in the Inflation
Process: The Econometrics of 'Self—Inflicted Wounds'," American
Economic Review, vol. 71 (May 1981), pp. 288—94. Econometric estimates
of equation (3) for the interwar period are presented in Robert J.
Gordon and James A. Wilcox, "Monetarist Interpretations of the Great
Depression: An Evaluation and Critique," in K. Brunner, ed., The Great
Depression Revisited (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), pp. 49—107 (see
especially Table 8 on p. 88).
16. The dummy variables are defined in note d to Table 1. The odd
timing of the Korean war variable reflects my verdict that the Korean
war controls did no more than consolidate the unwinding of the specula-
tive commodity boom of 1950—51. This interpretation is supported by the
fact that the variable is significant in the price equation but not in
the wage equation.
17. "A Consistent Characterization," p. 249.
18. On World War I controls, see F. W. Taussig, "Price—Fixing as
Seen by a Price—Fixer," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 33
(February 1919), pp. 205—41.
19. The major parameter shift evident in a more detailed study of
quarterly postwar data is a shortening after 1966 in the mean lag of the
distribution of weights on past inflation, which I interpret as due to
the growing importance of cost—of—living escalators. A return to a low—
inflation regime might well cause COLA escalators to become less
important, but this would not reduce the output cost of the transition
to that regime.
20. "Why U.S. Wage and Employment Behavior Differs From That in54
Britain and Japan," Table 3.
21. "Inflation, Flexible Exchange Rates, and the Natural Rate of
Unemployment" finds significant exchange rate effects in quarterly U.S.
data.
22.I emphasized the role of product prices as far back as "Infla-
tion in Recession and Recovery," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
vol. 2, 1971, no. 1, pp. 105—58. A contest between lagged product
prices and lagged wages in "Inflation, Flexible Exchange Rates," Table
6, p. 48, yields a coefficient on lagged wages that is both
insignificant and of the incorrect sign.
23. This is performed in "Inflation, Flexible Exchange Rates, and
the Natural Rate of Unemployment."
24. Although not included in Table 1 to simplify the presentation,
the difference between changes in the CPI and in the GNP deflator makes
a small and significant contribution in the U.S. wage equation,
particularly in the 1967—80 subperiod.
25. In light of Bob Hall's recent evidence on the importance of
lifetime jobs in the U.S., it is interesting to find that in 1966, 56
percent of males aged 35 to 39 had more than ten year's seniority in
Japan, against only 34 percent of the same group in the United States.
See Robert E. Cole, "Permanent Employment in Japan: Facts and
Fantasies," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 26, no. 1, pp.
615—30 (citation from p. 618).
26. Joanna Cray, "On Indexation and Contract Length," Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 86 (February 1978), pp. 1—18; and Ronald Dye,
"Optimal Contract Length," Carnegie—Mellon working paper, October 1979.
27. These generalizations are supported by citations and additional
arguments in Part IV of "Why U.S. Wage and Employment Behavior Differs."55
28. This section overlaps with part of Section 111.2 of "WhyU.S.
Wage and Employment Behavior Differs."
29. Gary Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic
Journal, vol. 75 (September 1965), PP. 493—517.
30. Alan S. Blinder, "Retail Inventory Behavior and Business Fluc-
tuations," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 12 (1981, no. 2),
pp. 000—00.
31. PhillIp Cagan, "Changes in the Recession Behavior of Wholesale
Prices in the 1920s and Post—World War II," Explorations in Economic
Research, vol. 2 (Winter 1975), pp. 54—104.
32. From Carl Kaysen, with frequent interruptions by Frank Fisher,
at Harvard in 1960—61.56
DATAAPPENDIX













is given after the listing for each country)
All data are from LTEG.
Series A7, linked in 1909 to Series A8.
Series Al, linked in 1909 to Series A2.
Nominal GNP divided by Real CNP.
"Total compensation per hour of work in
manufacturing, production workers, in 1957
dollars," series B70, times "Consumer Price
Index," series B69.
1892—1953, RJGM, Appendix B.
CNP:SCB, December 1980, page 17,-table 7,
and SCB June 1981, Table 1.1—1.2.
Nominal GNP divided by Real CNP.
1954—1980, RJGI, Appendix B.
1929—1946, "Total compensation per hour of
work in manufacturing, production workers, in
1957 dollars," Series B70 in LTEG multiplied
by "Consumer Price Index," series B69.
1947—1980, "Total private non—agricultural
average gross hourly earnings, current
dollars," Table B36, ERP, 1981.Key to Data Sources for U.S.
57
ERP Economic Report of the President.
LTEG Long—Term Economic Growth 1860—1970, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1973.
RJGI Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation, Flexible Exchange Rates, and the
Natural Rate of Unemployment."
RJGM Robert J. Gordon, Macroeconomics, Second Edition.











All data from F.
Table 1, col. (1).
Table 61, col. (7).
Brokenexponential trend line benchmarked in
1913, 1922, 1937, and 1950.
"Average full—time weekly wage rate," Table
65, col. (1).
Rate: see below.
From IMF (1981 and 1971), unless otherwise
specified.
Line 99b.58
GD? deflator Nominal GDP divided by real GDP.
Real GD? Line 99b.p.
Natural Real GD?: Broken exponential trend line henchmarked in
1950 and 1970.
Wage Rate: Average monthly earnings, all industries,
line 65.c.
Foreign Exchange Rate: 1900—1970 —AnnualAverage dollar
exchange rate: BEKS 1900—1970.
1970—1980 —Effectiveexchange rate, IMF
line amx.
Key to Data Sources for U.K.:
BEKS The British Economy Key Statistics, London/Cambridge Econ. Series, 1973.
F Charles H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure, and Output
of the U.K., 1853—1965.
IMF International Monetary Fund Annual Yearbook, 1971 and 1981.
JAPAN
1870—1940
Nominal GNP: 011K (1957), Table 3, col. (1), linked in 1905
to 0111CR (1973), Table 1, col. (6).
GNP deflator: OHK (1957), Table 3, col. (1), divided by
Table 4, col. (1), linked in 1905 to OHKR
(1973), Table 14, col. (3).
Real GNP: Nominal GNP divided by GNP deflator.59
Natural Real GNP: Broken exponential trend benchmarked in 1855,
1890, 1903, 1914, 1919, 1929, 1938, and 1953.
Wage Rate: "Wage Index," 011K (1957), Table 1, col. (1).
1960—1980. All data from IMF (1971, 1981).
Nominal GNP: Line 99a.
Real GNP: Line 99a,r.
Natural real GNP: Broken exponential trends benchmarked in 1953
and 1971.
GNP deflator: Nominal GNP divided by Real CNP.
Wages: Line 65.
Key to Data Sources for Japan:
IMF International Monetary Fund Annual Yearbook (1971, 1981)
OHK K. Ohkawa, The Growth Rate of the Japanese Economy Since 1878,
Tokyo: Kinokuniya University, 1957.
OHKR K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1973.